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How Civil Society Represents Women:
Feminists, Catholics, and Mobilization Strategies in Africa

Alice J. Kang
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

I

n recent years, civil society has risen to speak on behalf of underrepresented groups in Africa. In particular, civil society has advocated for the
representation of women’s interests (Tripp et al. 2008). Yet, relatively little is known about the full range of actors who seek the representation of
women’s interests, mobilize around women’s issues, and articulate specific
preferences.1 Some of these actors include not only feminists, but also religious activists who may clash over women’s issues. This gap in knowledge, moreover, extends to non-democratic countries. Who in civil society
seeks to influence the representation of women’s interests and how, in both
democratic and authoritarian regimes? What impact do civil society groups
have on specific policy outcomes?
This chapter contributes to the volume by addressing the who and how
questions of women’s representation. It identifies who in civil society can
potentially mobilize for and against women’s interests and how they try
to hasten, or delay, policy outcomes. Focusing on the African Union’s Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women, I find that feminist groups and
Catholic groups were central actors. These groups employed multilevel
strategies to gain the government’s attention. Both groups engaged in in1. Following Beckwith (Chapter 2 of this volume), women’s interests are socially and politically constructed values. Issues are choices that emphasize components of interest as a policy initiative. Preferences are alternatives on a specific issue.
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ternational networking and domestic lobbying, protesting, and consciousness-raising activities, though the strategies varied across democracies
and autocracies. I then find that women’s mobilization helped countries
ratify the Protocol more quickly, in both democracies and autocracies, but
find limited evidence that anti-Protocol mobilization slowed down the
pace of ratification. Thus, this chapter explores Implications 3.1 and 3.2
from Chapter 1 regarding the importance of the venues in which women
have representation.

Who in civil society claims to represent women?
Though the scholarship on women and politics predominantly focuses
on women’s groups, they are not the only ones who care about how governments regulate women’s and men’s lives. Religious actors can also claim to
represent women’s interests. For instance, Sisters in Islam, an international
women’s group of Muslim women that advocates for women’s rights, met
in 2003 to reflect on the challenges that Muslim women’s groups encounter
“in the face of rising religious extremism” (Othman 2005: xiii). Women’s activists from Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Morocco lamented that
states were rejecting policies that would promote women’s rights. Women’s
activists did not blame “Islam” writ large. This is an important point: Sisters in Islam was not struggling against religion per se. Rather, it identified specific Islamist political parties, politicians, and civil society groups
that were mobilizing against proposed policies. Similarly, one study of Senegal argues that “the factor assumed here to be a, if not the, principal force
restricting the political power of Senegalese women is the importance of Islamic institutions and leaders in Senegalese politics” (Creevey 2006: 154).
Opposition from civil society to pro-women policy is not limited to Muslim countries. One of the best-studied instances of anti-feminist mobilization took place in the United States, when conservative women activists
mobilized against the Equal Rights Amendment (e.g., Mansbridge 1986;
Soule and Olzak 2004). As Mazur finds, “[h]igher levels of feminist policy
were achieved in countries where fundamentalist Christianity was less socially salient and politically influential” (2002: 189).
To better understand anti-feminist mobilization, scholars have considered the conditions under which anti-feminist actors succeed in influencing
the state. One vein of theorizing focuses on pacts. Htun (2003a) compares
women’s rights policy making across Argentina, Brazil, and Chile under
military and civilian rule in the 1970s through the 1990s. Htun finds that
conflict between the state and the Catholic Church in authoritarian Brazil
and democratic Argentina enabled politicians to vote against the Church’s
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wishes and to legalize divorce. In authoritarian Brazil, the Catholic Church
had joined the opposition. In Chile, however, state leaders hesitated to legalize divorce. Civilian rulers were loyal to the Church because the Church
shielded them during the previous dictatorship.
Economic inequality might facilitate the success of conservative religious
activism. Blofield (2006) analyzes divorce and abortion reform in Argentina,
Chile, and Spain. She suggests that class divisions, rather than elite pacts,
affect the representation of women’s interests. Blofield suggests that in unequal societies, organizations like the Catholic Church have more financial resources than do women’s organizations. Thus, politicians court the
Church. For instance, Argentina’s former President Carlos Menem sought
out the Vatican’s support by formulating an anti-abortion agenda. Moreover, in unequal societies, politicians use moral issues to deflect the poor’s
attention away from their economic woes. Finally, high levels of inequality
undermine cross-class solidarity within women’s movements. Blofield attributes the absence of legalized abortion in Argentina and Chile partly to
the fact that middle- and upper-class women can afford to pay for medical abortions in private clinics, hence the lack of elite women’s mobilization.
In Spain, relative social equality meant that women’s activists not only had
access to the media and the political arena through a supportive left-wing
party, but they also were able to mobilize a broad, multiclass support base
to lobby for legal abortion.
A third vein of theorizing differentiates between doctrinal and non -doctrinal issues. Htun and Weldon’s (2010) global study of women’s rights policy suggests that religious leaders and civil society mobilize depending on
the type of issue, along with other factors such as the political environment.
Doctrinal issues, such as abortion, contraception, and family law, challenge
the letter of religion. Non-doctrinal issues, such as maternity leave, workplace equality, gender quotas, violence against women, and constitutional
equality, do not challenge the doctrine of organized religion. Htun and Weldon contend that if a women’s issue is doctrinal, then religious actors will
mobilize and challenge women’s rights policy, but if the issue is non-doctrinal, then religious actors will not mobilize.

How civil society claims to represent women
Civil society groups use several types of strategies to gain their government’s attention and influence policy outcomes. These strategies are used
singly. These strategies are also used in combination, including the combination of advocacy at the international level with advocacy at the domestic level.
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International Strategies
An important aspect of women’s mobilization for women’s interests is its
international character. In attending international conferences, workshops,
and trainings, women from around the world make new friends, share
ideas, and debate regarding what constitutes women’s interests. Women
in international arenas also identify and promote new international norms
to promote women’s interests. The creation of international norms can be
effective. Scholars have found that governments respond to international
norms because governments pay attention to what other countries do and
fear being left out (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). Additionally, scholars have
found that governments try to keep up with international women’s rights
norms in the hopes of attracting foreign aid and favorable trade and lending agreements (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2002).
Another strategy that civil society uses to gain government attention and
influence policy outcomes is to use international law. International treaties
can bind the hands of government actors and force them to reform domestic laws that undermine women’s interests. Women’s activists were instrumental in creating the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. Research
suggests that governments that ratify CEDAW adopt more women’s rights
policies than governments that do not (Stetson 1995). Women’s living conditions improve more in countries that have ratified CEDAW than in countries that have not (Gray et al. 2006). In her landmark study, Beth Simmons
(2009) finds that, all else being equal, ratifying CEDAW decreases the gender gap in education and increases the likelihood that a government will
adopt policies that will allow greater access to contraception.
Another strategy for civil society is to use international courts. Systematic study shows that through a long, incremental process of “judicial policy making,” the European Court of Justice expanded the protection of
women’s pregnancy and maternity leave policy in European Union countries (Cichowski 2006). Representing a woman who had been enslaved
most of her life, a coalition of international activists and Nigerien lawyers went to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Court of Justice to enforce Niger’s 2003 anti-slavery law. The international
court fined the Nigerien government, and payment was accorded to the
former slave (Duffy 2009). The ruling is now binding for ECOWAS’s 15
member states.

Domestic Strategies
At home, civil society groups use several tactics to advocate for women’s interests. Civil society groups can lobby government actors to build
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alliances. They can use newspapers, radio, and television to provide information to the public and mobilize public opinion. In the Republic of
Niger, a coalition of women’s activists used the media to call upon the
constitutional court of Niger to reject political party candidate lists that
violated Niger’s gender quota in 2004. In that year and subsequent election years, the law on candidate lists was enforced (Kang, 2013). Civil society groups can also organize demonstrations, at times marching to sites
of policy making to demand change (e.g., Fallon 2008; Weldon 2011b).
In 2002, a coalition of women’s activists, with support from UNICEF,
marched to the seat of the national parliament in Benin. The demonstrators demanded that the parliament review a draft family code, which had
been stalled for several years. The head of the parliament agreed to make
family law reform a priority, and the reform was made into law in 2004
(Kang 2010).

The Maputo Protocol on the rights of women
In July 2003, the African Union met in Maputo, Mozambique, and adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa, hereafter the Maputo Protocol. The Maputo Protocol is a bold treaty. It identifies a wide variety of African women’s concerns, from economic equality to reproductive rights to widow’s
rights. The Protocol further stipulates that women have the right to medical
abortion in cases of assault, rape, incest, and the endangerment of the mother’s health. It is the first international women’s rights treaty to take such an
explicit stance on abortion. Catholic civil society groups mobilized against
the Maputo Protocol, specifically objecting to the abortion clause.
By the end of 2010, more than half of the countries in the African Union
(29 out of 53) had ratified the Maputo Protocol (African Union 2011). Eight
countries ratified the Protocol in 2004 and nine in 2005. Following the fifteenth ratification, the Protocol went into effect, in November 2005. The
number of ratifications in subsequent years then tapered off: three in 2006,
four in 2007, three in 2008, none in 2009, and two in 2010.

Strategies used to advocate for the Maputo Protocol
Women’s activists from across Africa came together early to push for the
ratification of the Maputo Protocol. Activists employed a multilevel strategy, at the international and domestic levels, in democracies and autocracies. As will be shown below, the need for, and success of, a multilevel
strategy is evidence in support of Implication 3.2 (see Chapter 1) regarding
women having a voice in multiple venues.
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Networking across Borders
One key strategy for proponents of the Maputo Protocol was to coordinate efforts and share ideas across borders. In 2004, four organizations
(Equality Now, Fahamu, FEMNET, and Oxfam) created a network of supporters for the Maputo Protocol, called Solidarity for African Women’s
Rights (SOAWR). The purpose of SOAWR was to mobilize for the Protocol’s ratification and implementation. SOAWR’s 16 original organizations
operated in 12 African countries (see Table 1).2 Since 2004, SOAWR’s membership has expanded to include 39 organizations.
Another network of African women’s activists, Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), led by women lawyers and judges, joined
the movement for the Protocol’s ratification. WiLDAF was created in 1990
“to promote the development of strategies that link law and development
to empower women” (Hodgson 2002:4). WiLDAF organizes legal education
campaigns, provides legal advice to women, and lobbies governments to

Table 1. Original members of Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR),
2004
Organization
		

Country
Headquarters

1. African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS)
2. African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)
3. Association des Juristes Maliennes (AJM)
4. Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA)
5. Cellule de Coordination sur les Pratiques Traditionelles Affectant la Santé
des Femmes et des Enfants (CPTAFE)
6. Coalition on Violence Against Women (COVAW)
7. Equality Now (the Secretariat of the Coalition)
8. Fahamu
9. Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K)
10. Oxfam GB
11. Sister Namibia
12. Union Nationale des Femmes de Djibouti (UNFD)
13. University of Pretoria - Centre for Human Rights
14. Voix de Femmes
15. Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), Zambia
16. Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA)

The Gambia
Kenya
Mali
Uganda
Guinea
Kenya
UK, Kenya
Senegal
Kenya
UK
Namibia
Djibouti
South Africa
Burkina Faso
Zambia
Nigeria

Sources: E-mail correspondence between Equality Now and author (May 4, 2011) and websites
of the organizations.
2. I thank Brenda Kombo of Equality Now for providing this information. E-mail correspondence
with the author, May 4, 2011.

F e m i n i s t s , C at h o l i c s , a n d M o b i l i z at i o n S t r at e g i e s i n A f r i c a

143

reform laws, especially family law. Like SOAWR, WiLDAF brings together
women’s activists across African borders. It comprises country offices that
accept applications for individual and group membership. Individual membership is open to people of any profession, though the majority of individual members are women lawyers and judges. Additionally, local groups
may apply to be affiliated with a WiLDAF country office. These local groups
vary in topical interest (e.g., Muslim women’s empowerment, female photojournalists) and are not exclusive to women’s organizations (e.g., development NGOs, human rights NGOs). By my count, WiLDAF had offices in
23 countries when the Protocol became open for ratification (see Table 2).
Together, SOAWR and WiLDAF spearheaded a serious continental
movement for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol in democratic and authoritarian countries. In 2003, civil society groups in 25 countries belonged
to SOAWR or had a national office for WiLDAF.3 Eighteen of those countries were “free” or “partly free” according to Freedom House in 2003.
Seven countries were authoritarian or “not free.”

Lobbying
Activists mobilized for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol by lobbying key political actors. Activists in six countries used this type of strategy (see the quantitative section below for how I gathered this informa-

Table 2. Countries with a national office of Women in Law and Development
in Africa (WILDAF), 2003
1. Benin
2. Botswana
3. Burkina Faso
4. Cameroon
5. Cote d’Ivoire
6. Ghana
7. Guinea
8. Kenya
9. Lesotho
10. Mali
11. Mauritius
12. Mozambique

13. Namibia
14. Nigeria
15. Senegal
16. South Africa
17. Sudan
18. Swaziland
19. Tanzania
20. Togo
21. Uganda
22. Zambia
23. Zimbabwe

Sources: Butegwa (1995), WiLDAF (2001).

3. Zimbabwe. which is one of the 25 countries, is not included in the quantitative analysis below due
to missing data.
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tion). Pro-Protocol activists lobbied a wide range of political actors, from
ministers to parliamentarians to ambassadors to the African Union to heads
of state. Activists were reported to have lobbied their country’s ministers
for the ratification of the Protocol in Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, and Uganda.
In Mauritania and Niger, activists were reported to have lobbied the president. Interestingly, I found relatively few reports of activists lobbying
members of parliament, with the exception of Niger. This may be due to
the relative strength of the executive branch over policy making in African
countries whose parliaments are modeled on British or French parliaments
rather than the US Congress. In some cases, activists met with multiple political actors to advocate for the Protocol’s ratification. For instance, the Association of Malian Women Lawyers (an original member of SOAWR) and
the minister for the promotion of women in Mali kept each other informed
about their work on the Protocol. After the cabinet approved the decree for
the Protocol’s ratification in June 2004, the Association of Malian Women
Lawyers then directed its efforts to lobbying parliamentarians so that the
national assembly would approve the decree.4 Mali ratified the Protocol in
January 2005. In Tanzania, pro-Protocol activists lobbied two different ministers: the minister for justice and constitutional affairs and the minister for
gender, children’s affairs and community development. 5
Lobbying was more commonly used in democratic and hybrid countries than in authoritarian countries. Kenya and Mali, which had reports of
lobbying, were relatively stable democracies throughout the study period.
Tanzania and Uganda, which are stable hybrid democracies, also had reports of lobbying. Niger saw lobbying and was a relatively stable democracy until 2009, when President Tandja vied for a third term and dissolved
the Constitutional Court and National Assembly. I found one report of lobbying in authoritarian Mauritania, which was nonetheless transitioning toward more competitive rule during the study period. The lack of reports
of lobbying in “not free” countries may stem from the relative lack of publicly available information about pro-Protocol mobilization in authoritarian
states. It is plausible that activists in authoritarian states do have access to
government officials; authoritarian ruling coalitions may seek to address activists’ demands to promote the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad.
Women’s activists used popular culture to help lobby key officials.
Drawing on the colors of football penalty cards, SOAWR issued colorcoded pieces of paper to government actors. Green cards signified that
4. “Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: Update on Progress,” Pambazuka News 165, July 15,
2004. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.orglenlcategory/features/23224
5. Joshua Ogada. “SOAWR Update on the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,” Pambazuka
News 302, May 4, 2007. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/41217
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the country ratified the Protocol. Yellow cards meant that the country had
signed but not ratified the treaty. Red cards, given to countries that had
not signed the Protocol, read: “You have received a red card by the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights, a coalition of organizations campaigning for the ratification of the Protocol on the Rights of Women.”6 At African Union summits, members of SOAWR issued the cards to country
representatives, including ministers and heads of state. By 2007, the penalty card campaign became recognizable. When a minister from the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic received his country’s card, he gladly announced that his country was now yellow and no longer red.7 SOAWR
mailed penalty cards as well. Following the August 3, 2005, coup d’état in
Mauritania, Equality Now sent a letter to the newly installed president,
with a red card.8 Mauritania ratified the Protocol in September of that
year. The ratification could have been used to improve the country’s reputation internationally, including among the member states of the African
Union following the coup d’état. While the president’s concern about Mauritania’s reputation may help account for the country’s ratification of the
Protocol, the timing of events suggests that lobbying may have been an effective tactic for pro-Protocol activists.

Consciousness-Raising Activities
To raise the public’s awareness of the Maputo Protocol and to mobilize
public opinion, activists organized a variety of consciousness-raising activities, from press conferences to workshops to documentary screenings, in
both democratic and authoritarian states. Taking advantage of the widespread use of mobile phones, the campaign encouraged people to register
support for the Protocol by sending text messages and to sign up for free
alerts about the campaign’s progress. As reported by one advocacy organization, SOAWR received approximately 1,000 requests for text message
alerts in a six-month period (Fahamu 2005: 7).

Demonstrations
Finally, activists also created petitions and organized demonstrations
to show that the Protocol had popular support. Reports of petitions and
6. SOAWR Press Release, “Twelve African Leaders Receive Red Cards on Women’s Rights at the African Union Summit in Khartoum, Sudan,” January 20, 2006. Emphasis in the original.
7. Joshua Ogada. “Africa: SOAWR Update on the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa.” Pambazuka 302, May 4,2007. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/41217.
8. “Women’s Rights Protocol: Challenges of Domestication,” Pambazuka News 222, September 20,
2005. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.orglen/issue1222.
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protests, however, were relatively rare. Petitions and protests require the
participation of greater numbers of people and special incentives or conditions to overcome the collective action problem. SOAWR organized an
online petition. By their count, SOAWR had 3,849 signatures from individuals in nearly every African country (the exceptions are Chad, Gabon,
Libya, Madagascar, and Sao Tome and Principe). Individuals signed the
petition from other countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Turkey, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and the United States.9 In Djibouti, pro-Protocol activists in 2004 distributed a petition for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol and collected 383 signatures in the Protocol’s
favor.10 I found reports of petitions or protests in three other countries:
Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In the Republic of Congo,
women’s civil society groups held a march on International Women’s Day
in 2010 in which activists called for the Protocol’s ratification.11 In Zimbabwe, women’s activists marched in the streets to call for the ratification of
the Protocol in 2007.12

Strategies used to oppose the Maputo Protocol
Just as feminist civil society actors sought to advance women’s interests
by calling upon their governments to ratify the Maputo Protocol, others
sought to advance women’s interests by asking their government to not ratify the Protocol. Opponents of the Maputo Protocol used a multilevel strategy in their mobilization against the treaty in democracies and autocracies.
While some civil society groups opposed the Protocol, mobilization
against the treaty was not as widespread as support in its favor (see Table
3). I found reports of public mobilization against the Protocol in nine countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Tanzania, and Uganda. Public contestation over
the Protocol was particularly rare in predominantly Muslim countries. Out
of 18 predominantly Muslim countries in the African Union, I found reports
of public opposition to the Protocol in one, the Republic of Niger.13 This
9. “Petition Signatories.” Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/petition/signatures.php
10. “Campaign Update: What’s Happening Around the Continent?” Pambazuka 190, January 20, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features126462/print
11. Lydie Gisèle Oko and Yvette Reine Nzaba. “Les Congolaises organisent une marche.” Dépêches de
Brazzaville, March 9, 2010.
12. Nqobani Ndlovu. “Women Lawyers Protest over Protocol.” The Standard, December 16, 2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories1200712170538.html
13. Predominantly Muslim countries are those where more than 50.1% of the population is Muslim.
They are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia (Pew Forum 2009).
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lack of opposition surprised me because in previous research, I examined
why women mobilized against the Protocol in Niger and found that they
had rational reasons for doing so (Kang 2010). I expected other neighboring or predominantly Muslim countries to experience similar kinds of public contestation over the Protocol.
In the remaining eight of the nine countries, Catholic groups opposed the
Protocol, but there is another surprise here. Opposition does not seem to
correlate with the percentage of the population that is Catholic (see Table 4).
For one, opposition from Catholic groups emerged in countries where
Catholics constitute a minority: Cameroon (39%), Ghana (10%), Kenya
(30%), Madagascar (20%), and Uganda (35%) (Fox 2004).14 In countries with
similar proportions of Catholics, such as Benin, Zambia, Lesotho, and Swaziland, I did not find reports of anti-Protocol protests. Second, where Catholics constitute the majority, I found reports of anti-Protocol mobilization in
two countries (Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo) but not in the
other two (Cape Verde and Rwanda). The lack of anti-Protocol mobilization
in Cape Verde and Rwanda can be explained partly by timing: Cape Verde
and Rwanda ratified the treaty quickly, in 2005 and 2004, respectively. Yet,
Kenya saw anti-Protocol agitation as early as 2004. The connection between
Catholicism and anti-Protocol activism is not as simple as one might think.

Networking across Borders
Anti-Protocol activists came together outside their countries, as did proProtocol activists. In March 2007, the Standing Committee of the Sympo-

Table 3. Countries with reports of anti-Protocol mobilization, 2003-2010 (month
and year of first instance)
1. Burundi
2. Cameroon
3. Democratic Republic of Congo
4. Ghana
5. Kenya
6. Madagascar
7. Niger
8. Tanzania
9. Uganda

June 2007
June 2009
February 2007
April 2007
September 2004
December 2007
September 2006
April 2007
January 2006

Sources: AllAfrica.com and Madagascar Tribune.
14. Pew Forum (2011) is used to fill in missing information on Cameroon.
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sium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) met
in Accra, Ghana. On their agenda was the Maputo Protocol. 15 Speaking
in Ghana at a press briefing after the meeting, Cardinal Polycarp Pengo of
Tanzania said, “we admire the efforts of some of the United Nations Committees, like the International Committee of the Convention for the Elimination of every type of Discrimination Against the Woman (CEDAW),”
but “we equally denounce the unchallenged pressure they are exerting on
Countries in Africa.” Pengo asked African leaders to reconsider the Protocol: “We respectfully request all the Governments of Africa to remove from
the Protocol Article 14 # 1, e and 2, c and so defend our African cultural and

Table 4. Countries with Catholic minorities and majorities (above 10%)
Country

Percent Catholic

1. Cape Verde
2. Burundi
3. Rwanda
4. Democratic Republic of Congo
5. Congo
6. Cameroon
7. Angola
8. Lesotho
9. Uganda
10. Kenya
11. Zambia
12. Mauritius
13. Central African Republic
14. Tanzania
15. Benin
16. Madagascar
17. Togo
18. Malawi
19. Cote d’Ivoire
20. Namibia
21. Zimbabwe
22. Mozambique
23. Ghana
24. Swaziland

90
60
55
50
40
39
38
38
35
30
28
26
25
24
21
20
20
20
20
18
16
16
10
10

Note: Countries in bold saw anti-Protocol activism.
Sources: Fox (2004). For Cameroon: Pew Forum (2011).

15. “Press Release,” Daily Mail, March 27, 2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270231.html ; “SECAM Committee Discusses Report on Evangelization,” Catholic Information Service for Africa, March 27, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270681.html
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religious values with regard to the sacredness of life, before the final ratification of the Protocol.”16
Archbishops and bishops from Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Rwanda reached a similar conclusion at a meeting of the Association of
the Episcopal Conferences of Central Africa (ACEAC) in June 2007. Out of a
concern for protecting “African family values” and “women as mothers and
source of life,” the ACEAC declared that it opposed the article granting African women the right to abortion.17 International meetings provided a reason for Catholic leaders to come together and a space for them to identify
their positions on the Maputo Protocol.

Lobbying, Consciousness-Raising, and Demonstrations
Anti-Protocol activists also mobilized on the ground in democracies
and autocracies. Opponents of the Protocol lobbied political actors to
sway the government from ratifying the treaty. In Niger, opponents asked
the government and parliamentarians to refuse to ratify the Protocol. Opponents in Kenya met with President Kibaki to express their disapproval
in June 2007. Anti-Protocol activists also sought to demonstrate that the
public was on their side through petitions. In June 2009, activists organized a petition in Doula, Cameroon, against the Protocol for “legalizing
homosexuality and abortion.”18 Finally, opponents took to the streets in
protest against the Maputo Protocol. In July 2009, opponents organized
a march of silence over Article 14 in Cameroon.19 In Niger, dozens of
women demonstrated against the Protocol in front of the National Assembly in September 2006.20
Civil society actors in Africa are mobilizing around women’s interests.
The question remains: Are women’s activists and their opponents influencing whether governments represent women’s interests? I address this question in the following section with an empirical test. This analysis directly
16. Isabella Gyau Orhin, “Catholic Bishops Advocate Removal of Abortion Provisions in the African
Charter,” Public Agenda, April 16, 2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories/200704161064.
html.
17. “Le droit à l’avortement de femmes en Afrique: Les Evêques du Burundi, RDC et Ruanda
s’opposent au Protocole de Maputo,” La Prospérité. June 21. 2007. Accessed at http://fr.a1lafrica.
com/stories/200706210465.html.
18. Note that the Protocol does not make reference to homosexuality. Pierre-Marie Djongo. “De Maputo—Le rôle trouble de la France,” Le Messager, July 1, 2009. Accessed at http://fr.a1lafrica.com/
storiesI200907010578.html.
19. Eric Vincent Fomo. “Avortement—Quand le protocole de Maputo anime le débat,” Cameroon Tribune, July 13, 2009. Accessed at http://fr.a1lafrica.com/stories/200907130874.html.
20. Laoual Sallaou Ismaël. “Les femmes musulmanes interpellent le gouvernement.” Roue de l’histoire.
September 13, 2006.
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addresses Proposition 3, presented in Chapter 1, regarding the different
and multiple venues in which policy is made by government.

Does civil society influence the ratification of the Maputo Protocol?
In this section, I analyze whether civil society groups affected the speed
of the Protocol’s ratification in 47 countries.21 The dependent variable is
the likelihood of country i ratifying the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of
Women in year t (African Union 2011). The unit of observation is the country-year. In the data set, a country is included while it is “at risk” of experiencing the event. Once a country ratifies the Protocol, it exits the data set.
All countries enter the data set in 2003, the year the Protocol first became
open for ratification. The study period ends in 2010. I use Cox proportional
hazard models, which allows me to estimate the effects of covariates on duration time without parameterizing time-dependency. Because Cox models
assume that the effect of each covariate is constant, i.e., proportional, over
time, I look for violations of the proportionality assumption by calculating
scaled Schoenfeld residuals for each covariate.22
The central independent variables are mobilization for and mobilization
against the Protocol. Mobilization for the Protocol equals 1 once a national
newspaper or international news wire reports that a societal actor advocated for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol, and 0 otherwise. For instance, for Uganda, I marked that mobilization started in 2007. A Ugandan
newspaper reported that Akina Mama wa Afrika said they discussed the
Protocol’s ratification with a gender minister.23 I found reports by conducting a search on AllAfrica.com’s database for the following combinations of
keywords: < Protocol> <women> <rights>; < Charter> <women> <rights>;
< Maputo> <women> <rights>. For countries with no national newspapers in AllAfrica.com’s database, I searched national newspapers’ websites
by using the “Search within a site or domain” specification in Google’s advanced search. The data collection included newspapers in English, French,
Portuguese, and Spanish. Using this search method, I find reports of proProtocol mobilization in 23 countries between July 2003 and December
2010. Fifteen of the 23 ratified the Protocol. Mobilization against the Protocol
21. Morocco is excluded from the study because it was not a member of the African Union during the
study period. Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and Zimbabwe are excluded due
to missing data. South Sudan was not a state until 2011 and is not included.
22. The results concerning mobilization remain substantively similar when using Weibull event history models.
23. Geresom Musamali. “Kadaga Appeals to Govt Over Women Rights Law.” New Vision, August 9,
2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories/200708100088.html .
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equals 1 once a national newspaper or international news wire reports that
a societal actor moved against the ratification of the Maputo Protocol, and
0 otherwise. I find reports of anti-Protocol mobilization in nine countries.
Of those nine, five countries ratified the Protocol (Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda).
Because measuring mobilization through newspapers has limitations
(Earl et al. 2004), I also use an organization-based measure of mobilization as an alternative proxy. This measure follows Soule and Olzak (2004),
who used the presence of an in-state chapter of the American Association
of University Women, an organization that explicitly backed the ERA’s ratification, as a proxy for pro-ERA mobilization. SOAWR-WiLDAF equals 1
if, in 2003, there was an in-country office of Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR) or of Women in Law and Development in Africa
(WiLDAF), and 0 otherwise (Butegwa 1995; WiLDAF 2001; author communication with SOAWR). I chose to examine membership in SOAWR and
WiLDAF in 2003 due to data availability. (Some countries did open an office later.) Twenty-four African countries had a national chapter of one or
both of the pro-Protocol networks in 2003.
The models include six control variables. Women in Parliament is the percentage of women in the lower house of the national legislature or in the
unicameral parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2011). Women in Parliament ranges from 0 (Comoros in 2003) to 48.75 (Rwanda in 2004), with an
average of 13.08%. Women in parliament may also represent women’s interests (Escobar-Lemmon et al., Chapter 11 of this volume; Kittilson 2008;
Reingold and Haynie, Chapter 10 of this volume; Schwindt-Bayer 2006;
Swers, Chapter 9 of this volume). I expect that as the percentage of women
in parliament increases, the speed of ratification increases.
Two controls take into account the country’s political opportunity structure (see Beckwith, Chapter 2 of this volume). To control for regime type, I
use Level of Democracy as measured by the Polity IV Project (Marshall and
Jaggers 2010). Democracy ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). In this study’s sample, Level of Democracy ranges from -9 (Swaziland,
all years) to 10 (Mauritius, all years). The average across all years and countries is 0.97. As Level of Democracy increases, I expect the pace of ratification
to increase. This is because autocrats may support pro-women’s rights in
theory, but may undermine women’s rights in practice. This false support
for women’s interests in autocracies is known as “First ladies syndrome,”
“wifeism,” and “femocracy” (Abdullah 1995; Ibrahim 2004; Mama 1997;
Okeke 1998; Tsikata 1998). Democracies, however, may be slow to ratify the
Protocol as well. If the space for democratic debate is closed (Walsh 2010),
then one would expect democratically elected governments to be slow at
ratifying the Protocol. Further, the most organized and sustained anti-Pro-
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tocol movements arose in the democracies of Kenya and Niger. Kenya ratified the Protocol relatively late, in 2010.
To control for regime ideology, Left Leader or Government equals 1 if the
country’s leader or ruling party is Left-leaning, and 0 otherwise (Beck et al.
2001). Out of 265 country years, a Left-leaning president or government was
in power in 67 years. Countries that had leftist rule while they were at risk
are Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia.
Some countries become Left-leaning over time, such as Guinea-Bissau and
Sierra Leone. I expect that ratification occurs more quickly when a Left-leaning government is in power. Scholars have shown that Left-leaning leaders in democracies and autocracies are more likely to adopt gender quotas
and gender equality policies (Caul 2001; Charrad 2001; Htun 2003a; Tripp
and Hughes n.d.), though Left party rule does not always translate into the
adoption of other types of women-friendly policies (Htun and Power 2006;
Kittilson 2008; Mazur 2002: 189, 197). I expect Left-leaning governments to
ratify the Protocol more quickly in democracies and autocracies.
The fourth control variable addresses external incentives. Foreign Aid is
the natural log of net official development assistance per capita in current
US dollars in the previous year (World Bank 2011). Foreign Aid ranges from
-2.30 to 6.00, with an average of 3.57. A government might ratify the Protocol to demonstrate to foreign governments and international organizations
its commitment to liberalism. I expect ratification to happen more quickly
when governments rely more on foreign aid. In alternative models not presented here, I include other proxies for foreign incentives, such as whether
there is a liberalizing United Nations peacekeeping force in the country
(Bush 2011).
Finally, I control for religious demographics and wealth. Catholic is the
percentage of the country that is Catholic (Fox 2004; Pew Forum 2011). Catholic varies from 0 to 90, and the mean is 15.95. Alternative models examine
the hypothesis that predominantly Muslim countries are less open to international women’s rights norms (Fish 2002, 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003;
Poe et al. 1997). The percentage of Muslims in the country does not negatively influence the likelihood of ratification. GDP per Capita is the natural
log of gross domestic product per capita of the previous year (World Bank
2011). The natural log of GDP per capita varies from 5.52 to 10.36, with an
average of 7.46. Modernization theorists posit that post-industrial countries are more open toward norms of gender equality (Inglehart and Norris
2003). According to the modernization hypothesis, higher levels of wealth
should have a positive influence on the ratification of the Protocol.
Table 5 reports the results in terms of hazard ratios. Hazard ratios estimate the change in odds of policy adoption given a one-unit change in the
independent variable. When hazard ratios are greater than 1, this suggests a
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faster pace of ratification. Hazard ratios less than one indicate a slower pace
of ratification. The results show that the mobilization of women’s activists
increases the pace at which the government ratifies the Maputo Protocol.
The baseline model in Table 5 does not include mobilization. The political opportunity structure seems to matter. The hazard ratio for Women
in Parliament is greater than one, as expected. The higher the level of democracy, the faster the country is likely to ratify the Protocol. Countries appear to be at greater risk of ratifying the Protocol more quickly if there is a
Left-leaning leader or government in power. Contrary to our expectations,
higher levels of dependence on foreign aid does not correlate with a faster
pace of ratifying the Protocol. Note as well that the percentage of the country that is Catholic and level of GDP per capita do not appear to influence
the ratification of the Protocol.

Table 5. The determinants of the ratification of the African Union Maputo
Protocol, 2003-2010 (Cox event history analysis)
Variables

Baseline
Model

Mobilization
Model

Democracies
Only Model

Autocracies
Only Model

Mobilization for the 		
Protocol 		
Mobilization against
the Protocol 		
Women in Parliament
1.0425*
(.0258)
Level of Democracy
1.1196**
(.0500)
Left Leader or
1.9300*
Government
(.7070)
Foreign Aid
1.0031
(.2639)
Catholic
.9973
(.0096)
GDP per Capita
.8124
(.1483)
Log pseudolikelihood -84.3845

3.9910***
(1.6395)
1.7204
(1.3775)
1.0474*
(.0262)
1.0992**
(.0465)
1.6782
(.7294)
1.1664
(.3636)
1.0008
(.0105)
.8576
(.1471)
-78.4896

-22.9654

-37.0800

Number of countries
Number of failures
Observations

47
26
265

17
12
81

30
14
184

47
26
265

3.6480**
(2.2562)
1.5607
(1.4390)
.9683
(.0435)

5.3687*
(3.4840)
2.2204
(1.9599)
1.0601
(.0391)

8.2457***
(5.2831)

.7882
(.4306)

Hazard ratios are estimated using the Efron method for ties. Robust standard errors, clustered
by country, in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01
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What happens when we include activism for and against the Protocol? I
find a strong relationship between women’s activism and the Protocol’s ratification (Table 5, second column). When women’s advocates publicly call
on their governments to ratify the Maputo Protocol, governments are significantly faster to ratify the Protocol. Religious opposition to the Protocol,
by contrast, does not appear to be effective. This may be due to the relatively late timing of opposition. The earliest instance of opposition against
the Protocol I found was in a September 2004 speech at a seminar on women’s rights in Nairobi. Mirugi Kariuki, assistant minister of foreign affairs,
who would later become a parliamentarian and human rights advocate, “lamented that [Kenya] had not ratified the pact,” which was “being criticized
by religious organizations because it included abortion.”24 Kenya aside, the
majority of anti-Protocol activity took place after the Protocol entered into
force. In robustness tests, the variable for Women in Parliament does not consistently obtain significance at the .10 level. The degree to which a country
is democratic is important for the pace of ratification.
The last two models split the countries into democracies and autocracies
to examine whether pro- and anti-Protocol activism influences the speed of
the Protocol’s ratification under different regimes. Countries that scored a
six or higher from the Polity IV Project in 2003, 2004, or 2005 were coded as
democracies. The results in the last two columns should be interpreted with
care, given the relatively small number of countries and observations in the
models. Results for the first group, democracies, are shown in the third column of Table 5. The importance of women’s activism on the pace of ratification remains strong. Mobilization against the Protocol does not appear
to significantly affect the speed of ratification in democracies. Within democracies, countries with Left-leaning leaders and governments are significantly faster to ratify the Protocol. Contrary to my expectation, Left-leaning governments in autocratic regimes do not appear to be faster to ratify
the Protocol. Among autocracies, governments are also quicker to ratify the
Protocol when there is women’s activism for the treaty, including in alternative models where I include foreign aid and GDP as control variables,
neither of which are significantly related to the time it takes governments
to ratify the Protocol. Again, the findings are preliminary, given the limited
number of cases in the split samples.
Women’s activism is the only explanatory variable in Table 5 that has a
strong and consistent relationship across different models. This finding
holds in a variety of robustness checks. The importance of women’s activism holds when the models use an alternative measure of women’s activism,
SOAWR-WiLDAF (models not shown). The impact of women’s mobilization
24. “Equality Bill to Go Back to Parliament,” Daily Nation, September 21, 2004. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories/200409210073.html.
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on the Maputo Protocol holds when the models replace a dichotomous measure of Muslim-majority population with a continuous variable (Pew Forum
2009). Different sources sometimes produce different lists of Muslim-majority countries, so I alternatively use Fish’s (2002) and Fox’s (2004) lists. Others
have found that it is not religion per se, but state-church relations that influence women’s rights reforms (Simmons 2009). Therefore, I include a measure of state religion (Fox 2004). To assess whether large oil rents create a
structural impediment for the enjoyment of women’s rights (Ross 2008), I
add a variable measuring net oil and gas exports as a percentage of Gender-related Development Index (GDI) to the models (World Bank 2011). The
central findings about the effect of pro-Protocol mobilization remain substantively similar.25 Finally, leverage analysis suggested that Burkina Faso,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania are outliers.
When these countries are excluded one at a time, pro-Protocol mobilization
remains a positive and significant influence on the Protocol’s ratification.

Implications of the study
This chapter has provided an empirical analysis of who in civil society
claims to represent women’s interests and how civil society groups seek to
influence policy outcomes. Civil society groups employ a variety of strategies over time and across the continent, which is evidence in support of
Implication 3.2 from Chapter 1: success in realizing the translation of preferences into policy is greater when women have an influential voice in multiple venues.

Implications for Who Represents Women’s Interests
One implication of this study is that a wide range of actors outside the
state are actively involved in the representation of women’s interests. I find
that women’s activism is the strongest determinant of the timing of ratification. Women’s activism appears to matter more than the proportion of
women in parliament, though in two out of the four models, Women in Parliament gains statistical significance. It is possible that this study’s measure
of women’s representation does not adequately measure the substantive
importance of female parliamentarians or female cabinet members, who
may serve as crucial allies for women’s groups.
Future work should examine not just the percentages of women in office or in cabinet, but whether and when women in office and in cabinet
25. Future research could examine why some countries ratified the Protocol with reservations, but the
African Union has not released such information.
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form alliances with women’s groups. Dahlerup (Chapter 4 of this volume) argues that movements have to work to build a common ground,
and makes a similar call for research that examines the conditions under
which women from multiple venues form coalitions and work together.
The anecdotal evidence suggests that these alliances matter. Indeed, many
of the women’s activists involved in promoting the Protocol were judges
and ministers, who include women and men. As Maria Escobar-Lemmon
et al. (Chapter 11 of this volume) find, male ministers do propose bills that
seek to advance women’s interests; male members of cabinet may serve as
important allies for civil society. This analysis thus can be interpreted to
provide support for Implication 3.1—access to the right venue is critical
for the ability of representatives of women’s interests to change policy—
but it also indicates the need for more investigation of the factors that
make a venue the “right venue.” Only further research can tell us whether
and under what conditions women in African parliaments and women in
African cabinets are substantive representatives. Thus far, case study evidence goes in both directions (e.g., Beck 2003; Goetz and Hassim 2003;
Hassim 2006; Tripp et al. 2008).
A second implication from this study is that civil society groups sometimes but not always conflict over women’s issues. I was surprised by the
relative lack of public debate over the issue of abortion and other potentially contentious issues, such as the age of marriage and polygamy, in the
Maputo Protocol. Perhaps my surprise stems from the context in which I
live, in the United States, where debates over abortion and contraception
seem perennial. As Hancock (Chapter 3 of this volume) argues, race, ethnicity, gender, and other markers including religion are not static or homogenous categories. Let me be clear that I do not claim that African women enjoy free access to reproductive health; women face real hurdles in obtaining
quality health care. Rather, I suggest that scholars further study the conditions in which opposing groups emerge. Africa provides a rich and diverse
terrain in which to study the representation of women’s interests-both who
seeks to represent women’s interests, and how they try to do so.

Implications for How the Representation of Women Occurs
A final implication from this study is that advocacy for women’s interests is happening at multiple levels. Transnational networking is being
employed by advocates and opponents. Advocates and opponents of the
Maputo Protocol formulated and articulated their policy preferences in international arenas. Thus far, scholars have examined how transnational networking advances the representation of women’s interests (e.g., Keck and
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Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001). This chapter finds that much of the
opposition to the Maputo Protocol came from groups in the transnational
network of the Catholic Church. This suggests that the more conservative
religious groups meet internationally, the more opportunities they have to
discuss and claim to represent women’s interests.
References
Abdullah, Hussaina. 1995. “Wifeism and Activism: The Nigerian Women’s Movement.”
In The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women’s Movements in Global Perspectives, ed. Amrita
Basu. Boulder, CO: Westview, 209-25.
African Union. 2011. “List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa.” July 22. http://www.africa-union.org (April 1, 2011).
Beck, Linda. 2003. “Democratization and the Hidden Public: The Impact of Patronage Networks
on Senegalese Women.” Comparative Politics, 35 (2): 147-69.
Blofield, Merike. 2006. The Politics of Moral Sin: Abortion and Divorce in Spain, Chile and Argentina. New York: Routledge.
Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2011. “International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures.” International Organization, 65 (1): 103-37.
Butegwa, Florence. 1995. “The Human Rights of Women in Conflict Situations in Africa:
A Key Concern for WiLDAF.” Paper presented at the UNIFEM-AFWIC Conference on
Women in Conflict Situations in Africa, August 1-4, 1995, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
“Campaign Update: What’s Happening Around the Continent?” Pambazuka 190, January
20, 2005. http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features126462/print (Accessed
July 25, 2013).
Caul, Miki. 2001. “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A
Cross-National Analysis.” Journal of Politics, 63 (4): 1214-29.
Charrad, Mounira. 2001. States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cichowski, Rachel. 2006. The European Court, Civil Society and European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Creevey, Lucy. 2006. “Senegal: Contending with Religious Constraints.” In Women in African Parliaments, eds. Gretchen Bauer and Hannah Britton. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Djongo, Pierre-Marie. “De Maputo: Le rôle trouble de la France.” Le Messager, July 1, 2009.
http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200907010578.html .
Duffy, Helen. 2009. “Hadijatou Mani Koroua v Niger: Slavery Unveiled by the ECOWAS
Court.” Human Rights Law Review, 9 (1): 151-70.
Earl, Jennifer, Andrew Martin, John D. McCarthy, and Sarah Soule. 2004. “The Use of
Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action.” Annual Review of Sociology, 30:
65-80.
“Equality Bill to Go Back to Parliament,” Daily Nation, September 21, 2004. http://allafrica.com/stories/200409210073.html .
Fahamu. 2005. “Annual Report 2004/2005.” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
public/documents/other/unpan025352.pdf .

157-a

A l i c e K a n g i n R e p r e s e n tat i o n : Th e C a s e o f Wo m e n ( 2 0 1 4 )

Fallon, Kathleen. 2008. Democracy and the Rise of Women’s Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Fish, M. Steven. 2011. Are Muslims Distinctive? A Look at the Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fish, M. Steven. 2002. “Islam and Authoritarianism.” World Politics, 55 (1): 4-37.
Fogg-Davis, Hawley. 2008. “Theorizing Black Lesbianism within Black Feminism: A Critique of Same Race Street Harassment.” Politics & Gender, 2 (1): 57-76.
Fomo, Eric Vincent. “Avortement: Quand le protocole de Maputo anime le débat.” Cameroon Tribune, July 13, 2009. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200907130B74.html .
Fox, Jonathan. 2004. “Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996.” International Political Science Review, 25
(1): 55-76.
Goetz, Anne Marie, and Shireen Hassim, eds. 2003. No Shortcuts to Power: African Women
in Politics and Policy Making. London and New York: Zed Books; Cape Town: David
Philip.
Goodliffe, Jay, and Darren Hawkins. 2006. “Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture.” Journal of Politics, 68 (2): 358-71.
Gray, Mark, Miki Caul Kittilson, and Wayne Sandholtz. 2006. “Women and Globalization:
A Study of 180 Countries, 1975-2000.” International Organization, 60 (2): 293-333.
Hassim, Shireen. 2006. Women’s Organizations and Democracy in South Africa: Contesting Authority. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hathaway, Oona. 2002. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal,
111: 1935.
Hodgson, Dorothy. 2002. “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF).” Africa Today, 49 (2): 3-28.
Htun, Mala. 2003a. Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American
Dictatorships and Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Htun, Mala, and Timothy Power. 2006. “Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in
the Brazilian Congress.” Latin American Politics and Society, 48 (4): 83-104.
Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon. 2010. “When Do Governments Promote Women’s
Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy.” Perspectives on Politics, 8 (1): 207-16.
Ibrahim, Jibrin. 2004. “The First Lady Syndrome and the Marginalisation of Women from
Power: Opportunities or Compromises for Gender Equality?” Feminist Africa 3. http://
www.feministafrica.orglindex.php/first-lady-syndrome (Accessed June 5, 2009).
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change
Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2011. “Parline Database on National Parliaments.” http://
www.ipu.orglparline-e/parlinesearch.asp (Accessed May 2,2011).
Ismaël, Laoual Sallaou. “Les femmes musulmanes interpellent le gouvernement.” Roue de
l’histoire, September 13, 2006.
Kang, Alice. 2013. “The Effect of Gender Quota Laws on the Election of Women: Lessons
from Niger.” Women’s Studies International Forum, 41 (2): 94-102.
Kang, Alice. 2010. Bargaining with Islam: Of Rule, Religion, and Women in Niger. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Without Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

F e m i n i s t s , C at h o l i c s , a n d M o b i l i z at i o n S t r at e g i e s i n A f r i c a

157-b

Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2008. “Representing Women: The Adoption of Family Leave in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Politics, 70 (2): 323-34.
“Le droit à l’avortement de femmes en Afrique: Les Evêques du Burundi, RDC et Ruanda
s’opposent au Protocole de Maputo.” La Prosperité, June 21, 2007. http://fr.allafrica.com/
stories/200706210465.html
Mama, Amina. 1997. “Feminism or Femocracy? State Feminism and Democratization” In
The Expansion of Democratic Space in Nigeria, ed. Jibrin Ibrahim. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 37-58.
Mansbridge, Jane. 1986. Why We Lost the ERA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jaggers. 2010. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009.” College Park: University of Maryland.
Mazur, Amy. 2002. Theorizing Feminist Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
McCall, Leslie. 2005. “The Complexity of Intersectionality.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 30 (3): 1771-800.
Musamali, Geresom. “Kadaga Appeals to Govt over Women Rights Law.” New Vision,
August 9, 2007. http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200708100088.html
Nqobani Ndlovu. “Women Lawyers Protest over Protocol.” The Standard, December 16,
2007. http://allafrica.com/stories/200712170538.html
Ogada, Joshua. “Africa: SOAWR Update on the Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa.” Pambazuka 302, May 4,2007. http://www.pambazuka.orglen/category/
wgender/41217
Okeke, Phil. 1998. “First Lady Syndrome: The (En)Gendering of Bureaucratic Corruption
in Nigeria.” CODESRIA Bulletin, 3 & 4: 16-19.
Oko, Lydie Gisèle, and Yvette Reine Nzaba. “Les Congolaises organisent une marche.”
Dépêches de Brazzaville. March 9, 2010.
Orhin, Isabella Gyau. 2007. “Catholic Bishops Advocate Removal of Abortion Provisions in the African Charter,” Public Agenda, April 16, 2007. http://allafrica.com/stories/200704161064.html
Othman, Norani, ed. 2005. Muslim Women and the Challenge of Islamic Extremism. Petaling
Jaya, Malaysia: Sisters in Islam.
“Petition Signatories.” http://www.pambazuka.orglen/petition/signatures.php
Pew Forum. 2011. Christian Population as a Percentage of Total Population by Country. http://
features.pewforum.org/global-christianity/total-population-percentage.php
Pew Forum. 2009. Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
Poe, Steven, Dierdre Wendel-Blunt, and Karl Ho. 1997. “Global Patterns in the Achievement of Women’s Human Rights to Equality.” Human Rights Quarterly, 19 (4): 813-35.
“Press Release.” Daily Mail, March 27, 2007. http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270231.
html
“Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: Update on Progress.” 2004. Pambazuka News
165, July 15, 2004. http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/23224
Ross, Michael. 2008. “Oil, Islam, and Women.” American Political Science Review, 102 (1):
107-23.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. “Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of
Latin American Legislators.” American Journal of Political Science, 50 (3): 570-85.
Simmons, Beth. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

157-c

A l i c e K a n g i n R e p r e s e n tat i o n : Th e C a s e o f Wo m e n ( 2 0 1 4 )

SOAWR Press Release. 2006. “Twelve African Leaders Receive Red Cards on Women’s
Rights at the African Union Summit in Khartoum, Sudan.” January 20, 2006. http://
www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/images/uploads/soawr_press_ release_200106.pdf
Soule, Sarah, and Susan Olzak. 2004. “When Do Social Movements Matter? The Politics of
Contingency and the Equal Rights Amendment.” American Sociological Review, 69 (4):
473-97.
Stetson, Dorothy McBride, and Amy Mazur, eds. 1995. Comparative State Feminism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tripp, Aili Mari, and Melanie Hughes. n.d. “Women, Civil War, and Political Representation in Africa.” American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Washington,
DC, September 2-5.
Tripp, Aili Mari, Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa. 2008. African Women’s
Movements: Transforming Political Landscapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
True, Jacqui, and Michael Mintrom. 2001. “Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion:
The Case of Gender Mainstreaming.” International Studies Quarterly, 45 (1): 27-57.
Tsikata, Dzodzi. 1998. “’The First Lady Syndrome.” Public Agenda, January 19.
Walsh, Denise. 2010. Women’s Rights in Democratizing States: Just Debate and Gender Justice
in the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weldon, S. Laurel. 2011b. When Protest Makes Policy: How Social Movements Represent Disadvantaged Groups. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
WILDAF. 2001. “List of Offices.” http://membres.multimania.fr/cyberlys/wildaf/html/
eng.html (Accessed April 3, 2012).
“Women’s Rights Protocol: Challenges of Domestication,” Pambazuka News 222, September 20, 2005. http://www.pambazuka.orglen/issue1222 .
World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (Accessed May 4, 2011).
Wotipka, Christine Min, and Francisco Ramirez. 2008. “World Society and Human Rights:
An Event History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.” In The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy, eds.
Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 303-43.

